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NOTES AND COMMENTS
the apparent intention of the parties, or (2) that, as a matter of public
policy, where it is not otherwise clearly expressed to the contrary, an
alimony award will not be diminished by the defendant's subsequent
remarriage in a community property state.
It is submitted that the decision seems sound from the standpoint
of public policy. Since the prime purpose of an alimony award is to
provide support for a defendant's wronged wife and family, he should
not, by the simple expedient of remarrying in a state where community
property laws obtain, be allowed thereby to divest his first wife and
family of a large part of their support.
Many variations of the Kinross-Wright situation might arise in the
future. If the Kinross-Wright decision be considered as a judicial
expression of public policy, it seems likely that the North Carolina
court, in interpreting the term "gross income" in separation contracts or
alimony judgments, will continue to disregard the community property
laws of other states, absent a specific provision to the contrary.
ROBERT C. SOLES, JR.
Husband and Wife-Tenancy by the Entirety-Surviving Spouse's
Right to Contribution on Paying Debt Secured by Mortgage on
Entireties Property
H and W hold a house and lot as tenants by the entireties.1 The
property has a market value of $20,000. Part of this value is due to
recent improvements on the property, for which H and W jointly ex-
ecuted notes and a mortgage. H dies when there is still $8,000 owing.
W succeeds to the entire fee and petitions H's executors for $4,000,
claiming that amount as H's share of the joint debt. Under these facts,
the Supreme Court of Delaware recently held in In re Keil's Estate,
2
that the claim should be allowed.
The recovery was allowed on the principle of equitable contribution.
The rationale of the principle is that where parties are under a common
burden or liability, one joint debtor who pays the whole debt, or more
than his share, is entitled, in equity, to contribution from his co-obligors.
3
"' Estates by the entireties are creatures of the common law created by legal
fiction and based wholly on the common-law doctrine that husband and wife are
one, and, therefore there is but one estate, and in contemplation of law, but one
person owning the whole .... By reason of their legal unity by marriage, the
husband and wife together take the whole estate as one person. Neither has a
separate estate or interest in the land, but each has the whole estate. Upon the
death of one the entire estate and interest belongs to the other, not by virtue of
survivorship, but by virtue of the title that vested under the original limitation.'"
Woolard v. Smith, 244 N.C. 489, 493, 94 S.E.2d 466, 469 (1956), quoting 4
THomPsoN, REAL PROPERTY § 1803 (perm. ed. 1940).
'-Del.-, 145 A.2d 563 (1958).
* 13 At. Jua., Contribution § 3 (1938).
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The Keil case, and other cases4 in accord, hold that the right to con-
tribution flows from the fact that both parties were primarily liable as
joint makers of the notes, paying no attention to the characteristics of
the tenancy under which the security property was held.
Lopez v. Lopez,5 illustrates a line of authority6 contra to the holding
in the Keil case. There the Florida court disallowed the claim of the
surviving entireties tenant, saying that the doctrine of equitable con-
tribution applies only to prevent one debtor from having to bear
more than his share of a common burden, or to prevent unjust enrich-
ment of a non-paying debtor where his co-obligor paid the whole amount.
Applying this standard, the court held that no common burden existed,
because each was obligated for the whole debt, since each held the
whole fee in the mortgaged property. The court further pointed out that
there could be no unjust enrichment if the survivor were made to pay
the entire debt, since the decedent's estate succeeded to no interest in
the redeemed property.
The two lines of authority can be summarized as follows: Where the
survivor gets contribution the courts emphasize that it was a joint
obligation, stressing the notes, and playing down the tenancy by the
entireties in the mortgaged property. Courts that deny contribution
emphasize the nature of the tenancy, and hold that the debt takes on
similar characteristics, at least as between the debtors. Both lines of
authority leave the liability of the parties to the mortgagee unchanged.
North Carolina first ruled on the question presented in the principal
case in Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. Black,7 where it was held,
with no authority cited, that the survivor was entitled to contribution.
The reason given was the same as that of the Delaware court in the
Keil case, that "the unity of person is an incident of the estate, . .. it is
not incident to the note."
8
' Magenheimer v. Councilman, 76 Ind. App. 583, 125 N.E. 77 (1919) ; Cunning-
ham v. Cunningham, 158 Md. 372, 148 Atl. 444 (1930) ; Nobile v. Bartletta, 109
N.J. Eq. 119, 156 Ad. 483 (Ct. Err. & App. 1931) (partly based on local rule
that entireties tenants hold as tenants in common during their joint lives)
Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. Black, 198 N.C. 219, 151 S.E. 269 (1929);
In re Dowler's Estate, 368 Pa. 519, 84 A.2d 209 (1951) (vigorous dissent);
Newson v. Shackleford, 163 Tenn. 358, 43 S.W.2d 384 (1931) (Magenheinier case,
suzpra, relied upon, no contra authority coming to attention of court).
See Brown v. Hargraves, 198 Va. 748, 96 S.E.2d 788 (1957), where con-
tribution was allowed against the estate of the deceased member of a joint
tenancy with right of survivorship.
90 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 1956).
'Ratte v. Ratte, 260 Mass. 165, 156 N.E. 870 (1927); Robinson v. Bogert,
187 Misc. 735, 64 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1946) ; In re Dell's Estate, 154 Misc. 216, 276
N.Y.S. 960 (1935); Geldart v. Bank of N. Y. and Trust Co., 209 App. Div. 581,
205 N.Y.S. 238 (1924).
See also, In re Keil's Estate, (Mr. Justice Bramhall's dissent), -Del.-, 145
A.2d at 566; In re Dowler's Estate, (Mr. Justice Bells' dissent), 368 Pa. at 525,
84 A.2d at 211.
7198 N.C. 219 .151 S.E. 269 (1929).
1 Id. at 221, 15 S.E. at 270.
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In Underwood v. Ward,9 the North Carolina court seems to have
considered the character of ownership of the security by holding that
since the deceased's estate holds no interest in the mortgaged entireties
property, the estate's liability to the widow for contribution is not such
a claim as would qualify for preference as a secured claim under G.S.
§ 28-10510 thus, the estate being insolvent, the widow had to share
pro-rata with the general creditors.
In Montsinger v. White,"- the husband alone had executed the note
and mortgage and had later conveyed the property to himself and his
wife as tenants by the entireties. After the husband's death the widow
paid the entire debt, and filed a general claim against the deceased's
insolvent estate. The court held that by paying the debt she became
subrogated to the claim of the mortgagee. The mortgagee's rights
under G.S. § 28-105 are limited to a general claim against the insolvent
estate only to the extent of any deficiency resulting after he has first
proceeded against the security. Since here the security was sufficient
to satisfy the debt, the mortgagee would have had no right of action
against the estate, thus the widow, being subrogated, had no such right.
Thus, in North Carolina the rather anomalous situation exists that
where the survivor pays the joint debt he may receive contribution
from the deceased's estate. If, on the other hand, he pays the deceased's
sole debt, he is merely subrogated to the mortgagee's claim and if the
decedent's estate is insolvent, can collect nothing unless the security is
worth less than the amount of the debt.
The North Carolina court has not gone into the ramifications of the
doctrine of equitable contribution in the entireties cases. The court,
however, has generally cited with approval, American Jurisprudence's 12
statement: "In other words, when any burden ought, from the relation-
ship of the parties or in respect of property held by them, to be equally
borne and each party is in aequoi jure, contribution is due if one has
been compelled to pay more than his share. The doctrine is founded
not upon contract, but upon principles of equity."'3 (Emphasis added.)
Applying this equitable standard where the obligation is joint and one
tenant dead, neither the "relationship of the parties" nor the nature of
the security property ownership would seem to require that the "burden"
be "equally borne." The entire equity of redemption, formerly owned
by the marital unit, is now owned by the surviving spouse alone and the
p239 N.C. 513, 80 S.E.2d 267 (1954).
10 "The debts of the decedent must be paid in the following order: First class.
Debts which by law have a specific lien on property to an amount not exceeding
the value of such property... !'
"240 N.C. 441, 82 S.E2d 362 (1954).
12 See note 3 supra.
"Nebel v. Nebel, 223 N.C. 676, 685, 28 S.E.2d 207, 213 (1943).
See also Bunker v. Llewellyn, 221 N.C. 1, 18 S.E.2d 717 (1942).
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decedent's estate has no interest in the security property. From the
unjust enrichment standpoint, it seems that equity is not accomplished
by allowing the windfall which results when the survivor redeems the
whole mortgagor interest and is allowed to recover half the amount paid.
Conversely, if contribution is not allowed there is no unjust efirichment
because, having no further interest in the property, the decedent spouse's
estate acquires no unpaid-for benefit. Granted that his estate is liable
to the mortgagee jointly and severally with the survivor, this should not
be the primary consideration in determining the liability of the parties
as between themselves.
When a mortgagor pays off the secured indebtedness, he redeems his
equity in the property.14 When one of several joint mortgagors pays
the whole debt, the other principal obligors must redeem their respective
shares from the one who has paid the whole debt.'8 The amount of
contribution that can be claimed against the obligors who have not yet
paid is in direct proportion to the share in the security owned by each
debtor.16 Thus, the doctrine of contribution, in the case of tenants in
common or their estates, works to prevent the unjust enrichment of
those who did not share in the payment of the mortgage debt. But, in
the case of tenants by the entireties, this doctrine causes unjust enrich-
ment because the decedent's estate had nothing to redeem by contributing.
If X buys a house and executes a mortgage and notes for the
purchase money, and gets his friend, Y, to sign the notes, as an ac-
commodation party, we have a similar situation to that where one of the
entireties tenants has died. Both X and Y are liable,' 7 but as between
the parties, if X is made to pay, since he got the entire benefit of the
transaction, he cannot force Y to contribute.' 8 Likewise, if Y is made to
pay he would have a right of action for the whole amount against X
since the entire benefit went to X.19 Also, where X owns a fee subject
to a mortgage, and sells his interest to Y, who assumes the mortgage,
X becomes a surety for Y, who is primarily liable.20  Y, who receives
the entire benefit, cannot make X contribute, and if X is called upon
by the mortgagee for payment, he can look to Y for reimbursement. 21
In the principal case situation the tenancy by which the mortgaged
1 Riddick v. Davis, 220 N.C. 120, 16 S.E.2d 662 (1941); Stevens v. Turlington,
186 N.C. 191, 119 S.E. 210 (1923).
"Bain v. Howell, 247 Ala. 514, 25 So.2d 167 (1946); 86 C.J.S., Tenancy in
Common § 61 (1954). Cf. Raynor v. Raynor, 212 N.C. 181, 193 S.E. 216 (1937).
16 Ibid.
'
7 Dry v. Reynolds, 205 N.C. 571, 172 S.E. 351 (1933).
1 ". . . There is no obligation between the maker and the accommodation
endorser that the latter shall pay the debt. . . " First and Citizens Nat'l Bank v.
Hinton, 216 N.C. 159, 160, 4 S.E.2d 332, 333 (1939).N.C. GEN. STAT. § 26-3 (1953).
State-Planters Bank and Trust Co. v. Randolph, 207 N.C. 241, 176 S.E.
561 (1934).
.
2 Ibid.
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property was held results in the payor's receiving-as in the above
illustrations-the benefit of his payment. Therefore, it would seem
that equity would require that the nature of the security ownership,
rather than the nature of the obligation, be the controlling factor and
that contribution should not be allowed.
ROBERT L. LINDSEY
Sales-Implied Warranty of Title-When Cause of Action
for Breach Accrues after Purchase'of Precarious Title
In the recent case of Henry Vann Co. v. Barefoot,1 plaintiff and de-
fendants traded motor vehicles. Defendants' automobile had previously
been used for illegal transportation of whiskey, and after the trade it was
confiscated by federal agents. Plaintiff sued for the reasonable value
of the vehicle it had traded to the defendants on the ground of total
failure of consideration. Held, plaintiff had stated a cause of action
for breach of an implied warranty of title, but that in order to recover
it must prove that by legal proceedings the defendants' title to the
vehicle was divested as of a time prior to the trade.
The Supreme Court, reversing the court below, held, inter alia,
that plaintiff need not prove the offense which made the car subject to
confiscation. Accordingly, there is left open the question whether if the
offense prior to the trade had been proved, but not that the title of
defendants had been divested by legal proceedings, plaintiff could have
recovered. This necessarily depends on the answer to the following
question: If the vendor has committed some act or knows of circum-
stances which make his title precarious, 2 and he fails to inform his
purchaser of this fact, may the purchaser immediately sue him for breach
of an implied warranty of title, or must he wait until he has been dis-
possessed?3 In attempting to answer the hypothetical question posed,
it is necessary to consider the scope of an implied warranty of title, and
what constitutes a breach thereof.
Implied warranty of title is a well established doctrine in the United
States. The seller of personal property is held to warrant impliedly
'249 N.C. 22, 105 S.E.2d 104 (1958).
' The principle of transfer of a precarious title may be illustrated by this
anecdote: John owes Robert ten dollars. John and Robert are riding together
on a train. It is held up. The robbers are coming down the aisle of the car
relieving the passengers of their purses. Just before the robbers get to them
John hands Robert a bill and says, "Here is the ten dollars I owe you."
'It should be noted at this point that fraud of the seller inducing the sale of
personal property may entitle the purchaser to rescind the contract and re-
cover the consideration he has paid, even though the paramount title holder
has not recovered the property nor the vendee suffered any actual damages.
Case v. Hall, 24 Wend. 102 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1840). However, the difficulties of
proof presented by this remedy would make it highly desirable from the buyer's
point of view to be able to sue for breach of the implied warranty of title.
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